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Abstract: The ongoing pandemic of COVID-19 challenges globalized societies. Scientific and technologi-
cal cross-fertilization yields broad availability of georeferenced epidemiological data and of modeling tools
that aid decisions on emergency management. To this end, spatially explicit models of the COVID-19
epidemic that include e.g. regional individual mobilities, the progression of social distancing, and local
capacity of medical infrastructure provide significant information. Data-tailored spatial resolutions that
model the disease spread geography can include details of interventions at the proper geographical scale.
Based on them, it is possible to quantify the effect of local containment measures (like diachronic spatial
maps of averted hospitalizations) and the assessment of the spatial and temporal planning of the needs
of emergency measures and medical infrastructure as a major contingency planning aid. The spread of
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Italy prompted drastic measures for transmission containment.
We examine the effects of these interventions, based on modeling of the unfolding epidemic. We test mod-
eling options of the spatially explicit type, suggested by the wave of infections spreading from the initial
foci to the rest of Italy. We estimate parameters of a metacommunity Susceptible–Exposed–Infected–
Recovered (SEIR)-like transmission model that includes a network of 107 provinces connected by mobility
at high resolution, and the critical contribution of presymptomatic and asymptomatic transmission. We
estimate a generalized reproduction number (R0 = 3.60 [3.49 to 3.84]), the spectral radius of a suitable
next-generation matrix that measures the potential spread in the absence of containment interventions.
The model includes the implementation of progressive restrictions after the first case confirmed in Italy
(February 21, 2020) and runs until March 25, 2020. We account for uncertainty in epidemiological report-
ing, and time dependence of human mobility matrices and awareness-dependent exposure probabilities.
We draw scenarios of different containment measures and their impact. Results suggest that the sequence
of restrictions posed to mobility and human-to-human interactions have reduced transmission by 45% (42
to 49%). Averted hospitalizations are measured by running scenarios obtained by selectively relaxing the
imposed restrictions and total about 200,000 individuals (as of March 25, 2020). Although a number of
assumptions need to be reexamined, like age structure in social mixing patterns and in the distribution of
mobility, hospitalization, and fatality, we conclude that verifiable evidence exists to support the planning
of emergency measures.
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The spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Italy
prompted drastic measures for transmission containment. We
examine the effects of these interventions, based on modeling of
the unfolding epidemic. We test modeling options of the spatially
explicit type, suggested by the wave of infections spreading from
the initial foci to the rest of Italy. We estimate parameters of a
metacommunity Susceptible–Exposed–Infected–Recovered (SEIR)-
like transmission model that includes a network of 107 provinces
connected by mobility at high resolution, and the critical contri-
bution of presymptomatic and asymptomatic transmission. We
estimate a generalized reproduction number (R0 = 3.60 [3.49 to
3.84]), the spectral radius of a suitable next-generation matrix
that measures the potential spread in the absence of containment
interventions. The model includes the implementation of progres-
sive restrictions after the first case confirmed in Italy (February 21,
2020) and runs until March 25, 2020. We account for uncertainty in
epidemiological reporting, and time dependence of human mobil-
ity matrices and awareness-dependent exposure probabilities.
We draw scenarios of different containment measures and their
impact. Results suggest that the sequence of restrictions posed to
mobility and human-to-human interactions have reduced trans-
mission by 45% (42 to 49%). Averted hospitalizations are mea-
sured by running scenarios obtained by selectively relaxing the
imposed restrictions and total about 200,000 individuals (as of
March 25, 2020). Although a number of assumptions need to be
reexamined, like age structure in social mixing patterns and in
the distribution of mobility, hospitalization, and fatality, we con-
clude that verifiable evidence exists to support the planning of
emergency measures.
SARS-CoV-2 | spatially explicit epidemiology | disease outbreak
scenarios | SEIR models | social contact restrictions
S ince December 2019, a cluster of pneumonia cases in thecity of Wuhan, China (1–7), has developed into a pandemic
wave currently ravaging several countries (8–12). The pathogen
causing the acute pneumonia among affected individuals is the
new coronavirus severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus
2 (SARS-CoV-2) (8, 9, 13, 14). As of March 25, 2020, a total
of 467, 593 cases of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) have
been confirmed worldwide in 181 countries (15). In Italy, a
hotspot of the pandemic, the count, as of March 25, 2020,
refers to 74, 386 total confirmed cases and 7, 503 deaths (15–
18) (Figs. 1 and 2). The well-monitored progress of the wave of
infections highlighted in Fig. 1 (for complete documentation, see
SI Appendix and Movies S1 and S2) clearly speaks of decisive
spatial effects. Models are often used to infer key processes or
evaluate strategies for mitigating influenza/SARS pandemics (5,
6, 12, 19–24). Early attempts to model the spread of COVID-
19 in Italy (25, 26) aired concern regarding the Italian national
health system’s capacity to respond to the needs of patients (27),
even considering aggregate isolation measures. However, mod-
eling predictions therein disregard the observed spatial nature of
the progress of the wave of infections, and can treat only indi-
rectly the effects of containment measures. Critically, therefore,
to deal with what could happen next in terms of forthcom-
ing policy decisions, one needs to deal with spatially explicit
models (12, 28, 29).
We model in space and time the countrywide spread of the
COVID-19 epidemic in Italy (Materials and Methods), for which
detailed epidemiological data are continuously updated and
made public (16, 18, 30). Data are only a proxy of the actual
epidemiological conditions because 1) the number of infected
people on record depends on the sampling effort, namely, the
number of specimen collections (swabs) from persons under
investigation (PUIs) (implications discussed in Materials and
Methods, and SI Appendix); and 2) the effects of systematic errors
or bias in the official data result mainly in underreporting and
need to be considered. In fact, underreporting may apply even
to fatality counts, yet to a lesser extent with respect to reported
infections. Hospitalizations are known, but may underestimate
the actual situation because cases with mild symptoms (termed
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Fig. 1. Evolution of the ratio of confirmed cases/resident population in Italy. The spatial spread over time of COVID-19 is plotted from February 25 to March
25, 2020. See also animations from day 5 to day 34 in Movies S1 and S2.
asymptomatics in the model) are not hospitalized, for example,
due to saturation of the carrying capacity of the sanitary struc-
tures. For these reasons, we believe that these major sources
of uncertainty could be partially offset by estimating the model
parameters by using only reported data on hospitalizations, fatal-
ity rates, and recovered individuals, without considering the
statistics on reported infections.
We concentrate on estimating the effects of severe progres-
sive restrictions posed to human mobility and human-to-human
contacts in Italy (Materials and Methods; see also timeline in
Fig. 2).
Our quantitative tools (31–36) are Markov chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) parameter estimation (Materials and Meth-
ods) and the extended use of a metacommunity Susceptible–
Exposed–Infected–Recovered (SEIR)-like disease transmission
model (Materials and Methods) that includes a network of 107
nodes representative of closely monitored Italian provinces and
metropolitan areas (second administrative level). We use all pub-
licly available epidemiological data, detailed information about
human mobility among the nodes (i.e., fluxes and connections;
Materials and Methods), and updates on containment measures
and their effects by relying also on mobile phone tracking (37).
Their effective implementation is generally a matter of concern
(38). As explained in Materials and Methods, the compartments
of the model are susceptibles (S ), exposed (E ), presymptom
(P), symptomatic infectious (I ), and asymptomatic infectious
(A) (core SEPIA model) (Materials and Methods). The results of
parameter estimation allow us to analyze the relative importance
of containment measures and of the various epidemiological
compartments and their process parameters, which were also dis-
cussed in the context of spatially implicit models, for example,
in refs. 3–6, 13, 14, 25, 26, and 39. This is true, in particular,
for the critical compartments of asymptomatic (5, 6, 9, 28) and
of presymptom infectious individuals (see below). As the model
is spatially explicit, we implement a generalized reproduction
number, that is, the spectral radius of a next-generation matrix
(NGM) (35, 36, 40, 41), that measures the potential spread in the
absence of containment interventions (Materials and Methods).
We also calculate the dominant eigenvalue (and the correspond-
ing eigenvector) of a suitable Jacobian matrix that provides
an estimate of the exponential rate of case increase within a
disease-free population, and the related asymptotic geographic
distribution of the infectious (35, 36). In case of time-varying
parameters, significant technical complications would arise [e.g.,
computing Floquet (42) or Lyapunov exponents (43)]. Numeri-
cal simulation then supplies directly the desired scenarios in the
presence of time-varying containment measures.
A critical issue concerns the description of human mobil-
ity that determines exposures and thus, ultimately, the extent
of the contagion (28). Although the dense social contact net-
works characteristic of urban areas may be seen as the fabric
for disease propagation, calling for specific treatment of “syn-
thetic populations” (44, 45), here, because of 1) the large number
of cases involved, 2) the countrywide scale of the domain, and
3) the scope of the study aimed at broad large-scale effects of
emergency management, we choose to represent node-to-node
fluxes from data neglecting demographic stochasticity (but see
refs. 14 and 29) and social contact details. Stochasticity is con-
sidered through locally estimated seeding of cases surrogating
randomness in mobility, which had been considered earlier in
the framework of branching processes (14). Coupling this infor-
mation with the epidemiological data allows us to estimate the
effects of enforced or hypothesized containment measures in
terms of averted hospitalizations. This yields scenarios on what
course the disease might have taken if different measures had
been implemented.
Results
R0 =3.60 (95% CI: 3.49 to 3.84) is the estimate of the initial
generalized reproduction number, which includes mobility and
the spatial distribution of communities (Materials and Methods).
The full set of estimated parameters is reported in Table 2, while
the comparisons between model simulations and data are shown
in Fig. 3 for five representative regions and the whole of Italy
(the remaining regions are reported in SI Appendix, Fig. S12). An
animation showing the comparison between the simulated and
reported spatiotemporal evolution of the outbreak is reported as
Movie S2.
As noted in Materials and Methods, a spatially explicit genera-
tion matrix KL describes the contributions of presymptom infec-
tious, infectious people with severe symptoms, and infectious



























Fig. 2. Time evolution of the COVID-19 epidemic in Italy. Time marks are as
follows: a, the first patient with suspected local transmission is hospitalized
in Codogno; b, first confirmed cases; and c, d, and e, main containment
measures enforced by the Italian government (detailed in Materials and
Methods).





















































































































Fig. 3. Reported and simulated aggregate number of new daily hospitalized cases and deaths for COVID-19 spread in Italy (February 24 to March 25, 2020)
(16, 17, 18). Computed results are obtained for the set of parameters shown in Table 2. Lines represent median model results, while shaded areas identify
95% CIs. Clockwise from lower right corner (see Insets): Italy, Marche, Liguria, Lombardia, Veneto, and Emilia-Romagna. Other regions are shown in SI
Appendix, Fig. S12.
people with no/mild symptoms to the production of new infec-
tions close to the disease-free equilibrium. A graph representa-
tion of the spatial NGM (Materials and Methods) is shown later
(see Fig. 5C). Crucially, the dominant eigenvalue (g0 =0.24 d
−1
[95% CI: 0.22 to 0.26]) of the system’s Jacobian matrix, eval-
uated at the disease-free equilibrium, provides an estimate of
the initial exponential rate of case increase. The eigenvector
corresponding to the leading eigenvalue, which represents the
expected spatial distribution of cases in the asymptotic phase of
exponential epidemic growth (35, 36), is shown in SI Appendix,
Fig. S13. The main result emerging therein is that a completely
uncontrolled epidemic would have eventually hit mostly the main
metropolitan areas.
We estimate that containment measures and changes in social
behavior and awareness have progressively reduced the transmis-
sion by 45% (95% CI: 42 to 49%). The first set of measures
resulted in a reduction of the transmission parameter, βP in
Table 2, by 18%, while the second set of measures further
reduces it by an additional 34%.
Fig. 4 reports, for the whole of Italy, three different scenar-
ios in terms of the cumulative number of hospitalizations. We
chose to represent only this state variable for clarity, and for the
obvious implications on emergency management. The baseline
shown in Fig. 4 is the one in which the model has been identified
(lower curve and data) by including changes in the spatial human
mobility and in collective social behavior, jointly with their timing
(Materials and Methods). The other two curves represent “what
if” scenarios. The first (scenario A), corresponding to the mid-
dle curve in the graph, is the one in which only the first set of
containment measures is implemented. The second (scenario B),
portrayed by the upper curve, is obtained by excluding all con-
tainment measures. The comparison between scenarios allows
us to estimate the number of averted cases (excess of hospital-
ization demand with respect to the baseline), jointly with their
spatial distributions (maps of scenarios A and B in Fig. 4). The
actual number of averted cases is obtained by the difference of
hospitalizations between the baseline and scenario B (no con-
tainment measures). We obtain a median of 0.226 · 106 averted
cases (95% CI: 0.172 · 106 to 0.347 · 106), as of March 25, 2020.
An analogous plot for the total averted infections is shown in
SI Appendix, Fig. S14. Therein, one notes that the total infections
are calculated by integrating in time the force of the infection,
that is, the sum over all 107 nodes i of the flux (λiSi(t); see
Materials and Methods) leaving the susceptibles compartment.
The number of averted cases is computed as discussed for the
results on hospitalizations in Fig. 4. The median number of
averted infections due to the implementation of all restriction
measures is 6.49 · 106 (95% CI: 4.81− 10.1 · 106). Our median
estimate of the total number of infections, as of March 25, 2020,
is approximately 733, 000 individuals.
Discussion
Globalized societies are challenged by emerging diseases, in
many cases, zoonoses (46), often related to climate change (47,
48). COVID-19 is a paradigmatic example of zoonosis whose
pandemic character is tied to the globalized travel that spread
the contagion in a few months (11, 12). Scientific and techno-
logical advances in a variety of fields provide a broad availability
of data and modeling tools that must inform decision-making on
emergency management. This exercise intends to contribute to
this cross-fertilization.
Here, we have developed and implemented a spatial frame-
work for the ongoing COVID-19 emergency in Italy, which is
characterized by evident spatial signatures (SI Movies S1 and
S2 clearly show the radiation of the epidemic along highways
and transportation infrastructures). Our analysis of the con-
tributions of different compartments points to the important
role played by presymptom infectious in the disease spread and








































































































Scenario A Scenario B
Baseline scenario
Scenario B: no restriction measures
Scenario A: February, but no March restrictions
Fig. 4. Hospitalizations (graph) and increases of hospitalization demands
(maps), based on scenarios of modified transmission of COVID-19 in Italy.
Data (white circles) and the lower curve (baseline scenario) show, respec-
tively, observations and model projections of the cumulative hospitaliza-
tions as a result of the actual disease spread constrained by the enforcement
of the scheduled restrictions of the Italian government (see arrows in Fig.
2). The middle curve (dashed line, scenario A) represents the expected
demand of hospitalizations, had the government not imposed the fur-
ther March restrictions. The map of scenario A shows the corresponding
expected increase of hospitalization demand with respect to the baseline
as of March 25, 2020. The uppermost curve (dotted line, scenario B) shows
the expected hospitalizations, had no restrictive measure been imposed.
The map of scenario B shows the corresponding increase of hospitalization
demand.
growth (Table 2). The estimated high presymptomatic transmis-
sion parameter βP , with respect to the transmission rates of
symptomatic and asymptomatic infectious βI ,A, reproduces field
epidemiological evidence (49) and provides support for explicitly
accounting for the presymptomatic compartment in the SEPIA
model. This result may have profound implications for con-
tainment measures [possibly even centralized quarantines (50)],
because it may suggest the need for a massive swab testing to
identify and isolate presymptomatic infectious cases (51). This
underpins that greatly improved contact tracing has the potential
to stop the spread of the epidemic if reliably used on sufficiently
large numbers (52).
The lockdown introduced in Italy by the second set of mea-
sures was far more stringent than the first. As a consequence,
noted in Results, the transmission rates have been progressively
and significantly reduced. The different age of the measures
(current time minus its onset) has therefore produced different
effects. This needs to be accounted for, to properly judge their
effectiveness. At first sight, in fact, the effects of the second set of
measures taken in March could erroneously appear less impor-
tant than in reality (A in Fig. 4). Obviously, the effects of the
second set of measures will fully display their importance after
March 25, 2020, the end date for our analysis.
Our study presents a number of simplifications and limitations
that, however, do not impair our main conclusions. Specifically,
1) although the human effort involved in the collection of epi-
demiological data has been major, the granularity of available
data is limited in time, spatial resolution, and individual infor-
mation [for instance, the only published assessment of mobil-
ity changes in Italy following lockdown (37) refers to publicly
unavailable data; properly anonymized call detail records have
been useful in other epidemic and endemic contexts (34, 53, 54)];
2) should anonymized individual information from hospitals and
laboratories be available, a proper probability distribution of
relevant rates and periods (e.g., latency, incubation, infection)
could be employed by any modeling approaches (see ref. 55 for
estimates based on high data granularity regarding the Lom-
bardy region); and 3) the effect of age structure (56) in terms
of differential mobility, social contact patterns, vulnerability, and
case fatality ratio [often associated with hyperinflammation in
elderly people (57)] would need to be included, therefore relying
on higher granularity of data (39). Further developments may
also deal with operational predictions based on our modeling
framework, once coupled, for example, to ensemble Kalman fil-
tering and updates of parameter estimates and state variables,
as already customary in other epidemiological studies (58–60),
and currently employed only in a few studies on COVID-19
(28, 61). The spatial nature of the model, in fact, would pos-
sibly aid the planning of the agenda for differential mobility
restrictions and deployments of local medical supplies and staff
tuned to local epidemiological and logistic conditions. We do
not attempt, at this stage, to simulate the long-term evolu-
tion of the disease dynamics, because it depends on the time
evolution of the conditions determining critical epidemiological
parameters such as people’s behavior and contact rates, further






























































Fig. 5. Schematic representation of the spatially explicit epidemiological model. (A) Local transmission dynamics (as in Eq. 1). (B) Connections between the
local communities. (C) Main routes of COVID-19 propagation in Italy as estimated via NGM (SI Appendix).
















































We propose an estimate of total infections computed from our
model (SI Appendix, Fig. S14). We find a significantly larger fig-
ure than in the official counts: as of March 25, 2020, we estimate a
median of about 600, 000 contagions, whereas the official count
of confirmed infections is 74, 386. This result does not confirm
earlier, much larger estimates (63). However, the estimation of
certain key epidemiological parameters proves remarkably simi-
lar in ref. 63 and in this paper, possibly providing an avenue for
future convergence.
We conclude that a detailed spatially explicit model of the
unfolding COVID-19 spread in Italy, inclusive of the imposed
restriction measures, closely reproduces the empirical evidence.
This allows us to draw significant indications of the key processes
involved in the contagion, together with their time-dependent
nature and parameters. When applied by restarting the
simulation while removing the restrictive measures, the model
shows, unequivocally, that their effects have been decisive.
Indeed, the total expected number of averted hospitalizations
in Italy, a significant measure of the needs of emergency man-
agement (and the less error-prone epidemiological measure),
ran on the order of 200, 000 cases up to March 25, 2020, for
the whole country, and is known with sufficient spatial granu-
larity. Implications on fatality rates and emergency management
are direct, as the capacity of the Italian medical facilities—
although continuously expanding—is known at each relevant
time. Thus our results bear social and economic significance,
because they unquestionably support drastic governmental
decisions.
Table 1. Key epidemiological periods to model the dynamics of
COVID-19 together with values of R0
Period Values (days) Reference
Latency 7 (5, 10)
5.2 (CI95% = [4.1–7.0]) (4, 9, 14)
3.44–3.69 (28)
Serial interval 7.5 (mean, CI95% = [5.5–19], n = 6 (64)
5.1 (mean, CI95% = [1.3–11.6], n = 8579) (65)
4.56 (mean, CI95% = [2.69–6.42], n = 93) (66)
4.22 (mean, CI95% = [3.43–5.01], n = 135)
4.4 (mean, CI95% = [2.9–6.7], n = 21) (67)
4.0 (mean, CI95% = [3.1–4.9], n = 28) (68)
3.96 (mean, CI95% = [3.53–4.39], n = 468) (49)
Incubation 9 (mean, CI95% = [7.92–10.2], n = 135) (66)
7.1 (mean, CI95% = [6.13–8.25], n = 93)
6.6 (mean, CI95% = [0.7–19.0], n= 90) (55)
5.1 (median, CI95% = [4.5–5.8] (69)
5.2 (mean, CI95% = [4.1–7.0], n = 10) (9)
6.4 (mean, CI95% = [5.6–7.7], n = 88) (70)
5 (mean, CI95% = [4.2–6.0], n = 52) (71)
5.6 (mean, CI95% = [5.0–6.3], n = 158)
5.2 (mean, CI95% = [1.8–12.4], N = 8579) (65)
4.8 (mean, SD = 2.6, n = 830) (64)
∼= latency (12–14)
lag of 5 (4)





R0 2.2 (CI95% = [1.4–3.9]) (9)
2.6 (CI 2.1− 5.1) (72)
3.1 (CI95% = [2.9–3.2]) (55)
4.5 (CI95% = [4.4–4.6]) (73)
4.4 (CI95% = [4.4–4.6]) (73)
6.47 (CI95% = [5.71–7.23]) (5)
Materials and Methods
Epidemiological Model. Many models have been developed to describe the
course of the COVID-19 pandemic in individual countries or at the global
scale. Actually, no clear consensus has been reached on the different com-
partments that should be included in a proper model. Our model choice
was motivated by a review of the existing approaches. Most models assume
a standard SEIR structure but make different hypotheses on the nature of
the different compartments and their respective residence times. Some of
the key epidemiological features characteristic of COVID-19 are summarized
in Table 1, together with the appropriate references, while the different
approaches are described in more detail in SI Appendix.
Here, we propose and use a model that is elaborated moving from
the basic local scheme of ref. 5. By introducing the new compartment of
presymptomatic infectious individuals, we account for a peculiar epidemi-
ological state of the disease under study. Empirical evidence (see again
Table 1) shows, in fact, that the serial interval of COVID-19 tends to be
shorter than the incubation period, thus suggesting that a substantial pro-
portion of secondary transmission can occur prior to illness onset (68).
Presymptom transmission appears to play an important role in speeding
up the spread of the disease within a community, accounting for around
12.6% of case reports in China (49), 48% in Singapore, and 62% in Tianjin,
China (74). The core of our model is thus termed SEPIA and includes the
following compartments: Susceptible (S), Exposed (E), Presymptomatic (P),
Infected with heavy symptoms (I), Asymptomatic/mildly symptomatic (A),
Hospitalized (H), Quarantined at home (Q), Recovered (R), and Dead (D)
individuals.
The local dynamics of transmission is given by
Ṡ =−λS
Ė =λS − δEE
Ṗ = δEE − δPP
İ =σδPP − (η+ γI +αI)I
Ȧ = (1 −σ)δPP − γAA
Ḣ = (1 − ζ)ηI − (γH +αH)H
Q̇ = ζηI − γQQ
Ṙ = γII + γAA + γHH
Ḋ =αII +αHH.
[1]
In the model, susceptible individuals (S) become exposed to the viral
agent upon contact with infectious individuals, assumed to be those in the
presymptomatic, heavily symptomatic, or asymptomatic/mildly symptomatic
classes. Although the hypothesis might not hold for some very sparse com-
munities, we assume frequency-dependent contact rates (as most authors
do), so that exposure occurs at a rate described by the force of infection,
λ=
βPP + βII + βAA
S + E + P + I + A + R
,
where βP , βI, and βA are the specific transmission rates of the three infec-
tious classes. Exposed individuals (E) are latently infected, that is, still not
contagious, until they enter the presymptom stage (at rate δE) and only
then become infectious. Presymptomatic individuals (P) progress (at rate δP)
to become symptomatic infectious individuals who develop severe symp-
toms (with probability σ). Alternatively, they become asymptomatic/mildly
symptomatic individuals (with probability 1−σ). Symptomatic infectious
individuals (I) exit their compartment if/when 1) they are isolated from
the community (at rate η) because a fraction 1− ζ of them is hospital-
ized, while a fraction ζ is quarantined at home, 2) they recover from
infection (at rate γI), or 3) they die (at rate αI). Asymptomatic/mildly
symptomatic individuals (A), on the other hand, leave their compartment
after having recovered from infection (at rate γA). Hospitalized individ-
uals (H) may either recover from infection (at rate γH) or die because
of it (at rate αH), while home-isolated individuals (Q) leave their com-
partment upon recovery (at rate γQ). People who recover from infection
or die because of COVID-19 populate the class of recovered (R) and
dead (D) individuals, respectively, independently of their epidemiological
compartment of origin.
The model is made spatial by coupling n human communities at the suit-
able resolution via a community-dependent force of infection. It results
from local and imported infections due to contacts within the local com-
munity or associated with citizens’ mobility. More precisely, the force of
infection for community i is given by





















































































ij = 1 for all i
and X) that individuals in epidemiological state X who are from community i
enter into contact with individuals who are present at community j as either
residents or because they are traveling there from community k (note that
i, j, and k may coincide). Details are provided in SI Appendix.
A frequently used indicator is the basic reproduction number, namely, the
number R0 of secondary infections produced by one primary infection in a
fully susceptible population. This simple concept works fine in a spatially
isolated community, where everything is well mixed at any instant. Instead,
if the model parameters are inhomogeneous both in space and in time, the
number of secondary infections produced by one primary infection might
vary accordingly. Also, R0 may depend on people’s behavior and on the con-
trol measures being enforced. When a realistic spatial model is introduced
to describe the spread in a country, it is necessary to resort to the defini-
tion of generalized reproduction numbers based on the spectral radius of a
suitable epidemiological matrix (35, 36, 40).
If we consider the spatial model described above in the case when no
emergency measures are enforced and people’s behavior does not change,
then the basic reproduction number can be calculated as (see SI Appendix
for the detailed derivation)
R0 = ρ(KL) = ρ(GP + GI + GA),

















are three spatially explicit generation matrices describing the contributions
of 1) presymptom infectious, 2) infectious with severe symptoms, and 3)
infectious with no/mild symptoms, to the production of new infections
close to the disease-free equilibrium. The matrices CX = [C
X
ij ] (X ∈{S, P, I, A})
are row stochastic (i.e., their rows sum up to one) and represent spatially
explicit contact probabilities. Matrix G = NCS∆
−1 is constructed as follows:
N is a diagonal matrix whose nonzero elements are the population sizes
Ni of the n communities, CS is the contact matrix for susceptibles, and
∆= diag(uNCS), with u being a unitary row vector of size n. Matrix KL is
a spatially explicit NGM, whose spatial structure describes the main routes
of spatial propagation of the epidemic. Also, the dominant eigenvalue (and
the corresponding eigenvector) of the system Jacobian matrix, evaluated at
the disease-free equilibrium, provides an estimate of the initial exponential
rate of case increase, and the related asymptotic geographic distribution of
the infectious (35, 36).
Data
Available Data and the Course of the Epidemic. Here, we use the
data released every day at 6 PM (UTC +1 h) by the Dipar-
timento della Protezione Civile and archived on GitHub (75).
At times, data may be just a proxy of the actual state variables.
In particular, the number of infected people (be they exposed,
presymptomatic, symptomatic, or asymptomatic) depends on the
effort being devoted to finding new positive cases, namely, the
number of specimen collections (swabs) from PUIs. The stan-
dard methodology employed by the Istituto Superiore di Sanit
(ISS) for confirming a suspected case is the one used by the Euro-
pean Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (76). According
to the bulletin of the ISS (17), a median time between the
beginning of symptoms and the confirmed diagnosis (positive
swabs) ranges between 3 d and 4 d. Sometimes, however, peo-
ple test positive even without displaying symptoms (e.g., they are
tested because they were in contact with symptomatic infectious).
Therefore, it seems that the number of positive swabs may not
provide a reliable indication of the number of exposed, and prob-
ably little indication of the number of presymptom individuals.
Actually, these data seem to provide an idea about the number
of people who are infectious and have developed mild symptoms
(isolated at home) or more serious symptoms (hospitalized), but
much less about those with very mild symptoms who are not
always subjected to a test.
Measures for Mobility Restrictions and Contact Reduction. The
detailed sequence of progressive restrictions posed to human
mobility and human-to-human contacts in Italy may be summa-
rized as follows:
A) On February 18, 2020, a patient (dubbed “patient one” by
Italian media outlets) is admitted to the emergency room in
Codogno (Lombardy, province of Lodi) for pneumonia.
B) On February 21, 2020 (day 1), “patient one” is officially con-
firmed as a case of COVID-19 by Ospedale Sacco in Milano;
local authorities struggle to trace the transmission path, and
mass testing of population in the Codogno area starts; by the
end of the day other 16 cases in Lombardy are confirmed. A
further two cases are confirmed in Veneto.
C) On February 23, 2020 (day 3), as no clear link to travel-
ers from China emerges, evidence for local transmission for
“patient one” increases. A second cluster of infections is dis-
covered in Vo’ (Veneto, province of Padua). Ten municipal-
ities in Lombardy and one in Veneto, identified as infection
foci, are put under strict lockdown (red areas); some restric-
tions are enacted in Lombardy, Emilia-Romagna, Veneto,
Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Piedmont, and Autonomous Province
of Trento.
D) On March 8, 2020 (day 17), the whole of Lombardy and 15
northern Italy provinces are under lockdown. The rest of Italy
implements social distancing measures. A leak of a draft of
the law implementing these measures prompts a panic reac-
tion, with people leaving northern Italy and moving toward
other regions.
E) On March 11, 2020 (day 20), the lockdown area is extended;
severe limitations to mobility for the whole nation are
instituted.
Model Implementation and Parameter Estimation. The model has
been implemented at the scale of the second administrative
level (mainly provinces and metropolitan areas), which com-
prises 107 units. Therefore, census mobility fluxes available at the
municipal level (7,904 entities) were upscaled to the provincial
level (SI Appendix). Matrices CX = [C
X
ij ] (X ∈{S ,E ,P , I ,A})
are derived from the mobility data.
We explicitly reproduce in our simulations the effects of the
restriction measures described above by 1) restricting access and
exit from the red areas (SI Appendix, Figs. S5–S7), starting from
February 23, 2020, and 2) reducing the fraction of people trav-
eling outside the resident province according to data collected
through mobile applications and presented in ref. 37. To sim-
ulate the change in social behavior and the increase in social
Table 2. List of estimated parameters, MCMC estimates and
relevant priors of each parameter with N (a, b) being a normal
distribution of average a and SD b, and U (a, b) being a uniform
distribution in the interval [a,b]
Parameter Median (95% CIs) Prior
R0 (-) 3.60 [3.49, 3.84] N (2.5, 0.25)
1/δE (d) 3.32 [3.03, 3.66] N (4, 0.4)
1/δP (d) 0.75 [0.61, 1.02] N (1, 0.1)
1/η (d) 4.05 [3.85, 4.29] N (4, 0.4)
1/γI (d) 14.32 [13.64, 15.81] U(0, 100)
1/αI (d) 24.23 [22.35, 26.87] U(0, 100)
βA/βP (-) 0.033 [0.027, 0.0036] U(0, 0.5)
βI/βA (-) 1.03 [0.79, 1.38] N (1, 0.2)
βP1/βP (-) 0.82 [0.77, 0.86] U(0, 1)
βP2/βP1 (-) 0.66 [0.64, 0.70] U(0, 1)
∆t0 (d) 34.94 [31.62, 39.30] U(0, 100)
ω (-) 7.84 [7.10, 8.34] U(0, 100)
Posterior distributions are shown in SI Appendix, Fig. S15.
















































distancing, we assume that the transmission parameters βP , βI ,
and βA had a sharp decrease (within 2 d) after the measures
announced on February 24 and March 8, 2020, and we esti-
mate those step reductions (Table 2). It should be noted that the
reduction in the transmission parameters is due not only to the
implementation of restriction measures (e.g., school and office
closures) but also to the increased awareness of the population,
especially after the first cases were reported.
Model parameters are estimated in a Bayesian framework by
sampling the posterior parameter distribution via the DREAMzs
(77) implementation of the MCMC algorithm. As testing effort
and quarantine policy vary across different Italian regions, we
prefer to focus on more reliable variables like the number of
hospitalized people, deaths, and patients discharged from the
hospital. Specifically, we define the likelihood based on daily
numbers of hospitalized cases (flux ηI ), discharged from hospital
(γHH ), and recorded deaths (αHH ) at the province level. To
account for possible overdispersion of the data, we assume that
each data point follows a negative binomial distribution (78, 79)
with mean µ, equal to the value predicted by the model, and
variance equal to ωµ (NB1 parametrization). We estimated the
parameter ω.
To account for the temporal evolution of the epidemics prior
to the first detected patient, we impose an initial condition of
one exposed individual in the province of Lodi (where the first
cases emerged) ∆t0 days before February 24, 2020, and we
estimate this parameter. During this period, the disease was
likely seeded into other provinces via either human mobility
or importation of cases from abroad. The process during this
period was likely characterized by high demographic stochastic-
ity due to the low number of involved individuals, and thus it
can hardly be captured by our deterministic modeling of average
mobility and disease transmission. Moreover, long-distance trav-
els and importation of cases are not accounted for in the data
used to represent human mobility, which mostly reflect commut-
ing fluxes for work and study purposes. Therefore, to include
this possible seeding effect, we estimated also the initial con-
dition in each province. Specifically, this is done by seeding a
small fraction of exposed individuals at the beginning of the
simulation.
The list of estimated parameters is reported in Table 2. The
parameter βP is expressed as a function of the local reproduc-
tion number R0 (SI Appendix). βP1 and βP2 represent the values
of the parameter βP after the measures introduced on February
22 and on March 8, 2020, respectively. The fraction of symp-
tomatic infected being quarantined, ζ, is assumed to be equal to
0.4, that is, the average value for Italy during the observed period
(17). During preliminary tests, we found a correlation between
the asymptomatic fraction (1−σ) and the asymptomatic trans-
mission rate βA. Indeed, in the early phase of an epidemic,
when the depletion of susceptible is not significant, it is diffi-
cult to estimate the role or asymptomatics. We therefore fixed
σ to a reasonable value (σ=0.25; see, e.g., ref. 80) and esti-
mated βA. The parameter rX represents the fraction of total
personal contacts that individuals belonging to the X compart-
ment have in the destination community (SI Appendix). We
assume rS =0.5 (i.e., each individual has, on average, half of
the contacts in the place of work or study) and that rE = rP =
rA = rR = rS , while rI = rQ = rH =0 (no extra province mobility
of symptomatic infected, quarantined, and hospitalized individ-
uals). Further assumptions aimed at reducing the number of
parameters to be estimated are γQ = γI = γH , γA =2γI , and
αH =αI . We use information summarized in Table 1 to define
prior distributions of key timescale parameters (Table 2). More-
over, the viral load of symptomatic cases is reportedly similar to
that of the asymptomatic (81). We use such information to define
the prior of the ratio βI /βA.
Data Availability. All data used in this manuscript are publicly
available. COVID-19 epidemiological data for Italy are avail-
able at https://github.com/pcm-dpc/COVID-19. Mobility data at
municipality scale are available at https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/
139381. Population census data are available at http://dati.istat.
it/Index.aspx?QueryId=18460.
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